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The Original Understanding of Constitutional 
Legitimacy 
Ilan Wurman∗ 
This Article argues that three influential schools of originalism, 
which we might label libertarian, progressive, and conservative, adhere 
to particular understandings of constitutional legitimacy, which then 
inform their particular constitutional hermeneutics. The Article 
demonstrates that as originally understood by the Founders, however, 
constitutional legitimacy depended on all three conceptions advocated 
by these schools of thought—that is, the Constitution had to protect 
natural rights, it had to enable self-government, and it had to be 
ratified by popular sovereignty. Further, the Article gives considerable 
treatment—remarkably for the first time in the law review literature—
to James Madison’s letter in response to Thomas Jefferson’s famous 
“dead hand of the past” argument, in which we might find an 
understudied ground for constitutional obedience: prudence. 
The discussion on the Founders’ original understanding of 
constitutional legitimacy provides two principal insights: First, it 
provides us with a more holistic case for constitutional obedience than 
modern originalist theories, whose narrower theories of legitimacy may 
be unpersuasive standing alone. Second, it demonstrates that broader 
hermeneutics are necessary as an originalist matter or simply because 
we find the Founders’ understanding more persuasive. The Article will 
also suggest, in the conclusion, that the more holistic account of 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the last few decades, many originalists have developed 
theories of constitutional interpretation around particular notions of 
constitutional legitimacy. This Article will show that three influential, 
contemporary originalist constitutional theories—which we may 
tentatively label libertarian, progressive, and conservative theories—
propose or assume a particular notion of constitutional legitimacy. 
Each theory of legitimacy then seems to require, or at least to 
inform, a particular method of constitutional interpretation. The 
Article, however, will conclude that constitutional legitimacy, at least 
as originally understood by the Founders, was rooted in grounds 
broader than those offered by modern originalist theories. Broader 
hermeneutics may therefore be necessary either as an originalist 
matter or simply because we find the Founders’ understanding of 
legitimacy more persuasive. The Article will also suggest generally 
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that the Founders’ broader understanding of constitutional 
legitimacy may prove more persuasive than the legitimacy theories of 
modern scholars. 
Each originalist theory develops a hermeneutic that stems from 
its understanding of legitimacy. We may say, as an approximation, 
that libertarian thinkers support what Randy Barnett has called a 
“presumption of liberty,” stemming from their natural rights theory 
of the Constitution.1 Progressive originalists advocate what I shall 
call the “progressive presumption,” which aims to enhance or enable 
democratic decision making through a judicial activism of sorts.2 
Jack Balkin is the most recent and comprehensive advocate of this 
view in his book Living Originalism,3 which argues that the open-
ended rights provisions of the Constitution were intended to enable 
future democratic decision making through debates over 
constitutional construction. Finally, more conservative thinkers 
support a “presumption of constitutionality,” stemming from what 
they see as their commitment to self-government and judicial 
restraint.4 
The vast majority of the originalists surveyed in this Article fall 
into the third camp. Although there are only a few libertarian and 
progressive scholars in this field, these few have had a tremendous 
impact not only on legal scholarship, but also on popular thinking 
about originalism. They deserve as much attention, therefore, as 
their more numerous conservative counterparts. 
Describing these theories of interpretation in terms of these 
presumptions will help our analysis.5 Each theory focuses on some 
 
 1. See infra Part I.A. 
 2. See infra Part I.B. 
 3. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
 4. See infra Part I.C. 
 5. Several scholars have tried to characterize the different schools of originalism in 
other ways. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 18–34 (1999) (classifying the theories 
in terms of their emphasis on democracy, rights, natural law, or pragmatism) [hereinafter 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, 
Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 247–62 (2009) (tracing the evolution of originalism 
from original intention to original meaning, then to original public understanding, and now to 
new theories of a “hypothetical, reasonable person” understanding); Vasan Kesavan & Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 1113, 1134–48 (2003); Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV. 
J.L & PUB. POL’Y 29, 33 (2011) (noting that there are several kinds of originalism—
“[l]ibertarian-oriented natural rights theories, pragmatic law-and-economic theories, . . . and 
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over-arching principle of constitutional legitimacy, which then seems 
to require a particular understanding of the meaning of the 
Constitution. These interpretations, however, fail to recognize that 
the Framers intended, and the ratifying public likely understood, the 
Constitution to achieve several ends at once and that it may 
therefore be legitimate for broader reasons.6 
The libertarian-originalist scholars emphasize that obedience to 
the Constitution is warranted only if we abandon the idea of consent 
and replace it with the notion that the Constitution must protect our 
natural rights. As Barnett argues, we must obey the Constitution 
only if it is, on the whole, just by some conception of justice.7 The 
progressive constitutional theorists all depend on some notion of 
current democratic legitimacy, successive acts of popular sovereignty, 
or enhancing democracy to justify constitutional obedience.8 The 
presumption-of-constitutionality originalists—that is, most 
originalists—rely on the initial act of popular sovereignty as 
demanding obedience to the Constitution.9 
Part I of this Article provides a new account of these theories 
that allows us better to see how the theorists’ particular 
understandings of constitutional legitimacy lead to particular 
hermeneutics. Specifically, it will show that (1) each of the following 
theories demands a certain kind of constitutional legitimacy for the 
Constitution to have a claim to our obedience; (2) each demands an 
 
Burkean doctrinal theories”). I am not classifying the theories along these lines, but rather on 
the constitutional presumptions that tend to flow from them. The authors examined in this 
Article, moreover, do not all use the term “original meaning” in exactly the same way. They all 
frequently use it, however, to refer to how the ratifying public understood the text’s meaning 
or to what the Framers intended. Because I believe there is substantial overlap between these 
understandings of original meaning, I will use “original meaning” loosely to refer to both. 
 6. Others have criticized constitutional theorists for elevating some principles of the 
constitutional text at the expense of others. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 23 (“Ely is not convincing in demonstrating that the 
Constitution is uniquely concerned with procedural values to the exclusion of various 
substantive commitments.”); id. at 29 (“In both theory and practice, the rights approach has 
been highly selective in its choice of values to elevate to a fundamental position worthy of 
judicial protection.”). I will try to show this more systematically through an examination of 
how the Framers understood constitutional legitimacy itself. 
 7. See infra Part I.A. 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
 9. See infra Part I.C. It is worth repeating that this categorization is a generalization. 
As I will emphasize later, the presumption of constitutionality encompasses a large number of 
originalists who certainly disagree on important points of constitutional theory. 
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“original meaning” interpretation independent of the question of 
constitutional legitimacy; and yet (3) each seems to require a 
different interpretive method as a result of its particular 
understanding of constitutional legitimacy. The ultimate claim is that 
each of these theories of legitimacy is incomplete, and thus each 
particular hermeneutic is also incomplete. 
Part II gives a short account of how the Founders, and 
particularly James Madison, understood constitutional legitimacy 
and the idea of founding. It will show that the Founders understood 
that the Constitution needed to be legitimate in each of the three 
conceptions advocated by these different schools—that it must be 
based on consent of the governed (or popular sovereignty), that it 
must enable a representative (or republican) form of government, 
and that it must secure the just ends of government. This Part will 
then examine Madison’s response to Jefferson’s letter in which the 
latter famously raised the “dead hand of the past” argument, the 
claim that the Constitution cannot bind succeeding generations. 
While Jefferson’s letter is well known and often quoted (especially by 
progressives), Madison’s direct response to Jefferson in his own 
letter, as far as I can tell, has never received any considerable 
treatment in the literature. I believe Madison’s argument provides us 
with an additional reason for constitutional obedience: although the 
Constitution may be imperfectly legitimate, prudence may 
nevertheless justify adherence to the whole. 
The principal insights of Part II are these: First, the question of 
why the Constitution ought to be binding is important to all 
constitutional theories and to all American citizens who must choose 
whether or not to obey the Constitution today. While the political 
and philosophical views of the Founding generation cannot boot-
strap themselves into acceptance, surely there is great wisdom to be 
found in the generation that had to justify breaking away from its 
previous allegiance and justify an entirely new mode of government. 
Whether we are ultimately persuaded by them or not, the Founders 
provide us with a more holistic account of why the Constitution is 
legitimate than many other theories do. It is my view that the three 
grounds of legitimacy, along with prudence as a fourth ground, 
justify constitutional obedience. 
Second, if the Constitution can only be legitimate, at least in the 
Founders’ view, if it satisfies all three conceptions of legitimacy, then 
hermeneutics broader than those proposed by many current scholars 
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are necessary as an originalist matter. Determining the proper 
interpretive method may be a difficult enterprise because of the 
compromises the Framers made among the competing ends of 
government, but I will briefly suggest that an original interpretive 
conventions approach may be a promising way to discern original 
meaning. 
There is another possible insight from this discussion that will 
require further study. The Article will note in conclusion that the 
question of why the Constitution should be obeyed and whether 
originalism is the proper hermeneutic approach are conceptually 
distinct questions; one could conclude that the Constitution is 
worthy of obedience but that it requires a non-originalist 
interpretation. This Article aims to begin the argument that 
constitutional obedience, rooted in the Founders’ grounds for 
constitutional legitimacy, may provide a new rationale for originalist 
interpretation. This would extend beyond the rationales rooted in 
the “writtenness” of the text—rationales to which the libertarian, 
progressive, and conservative originalists all adhere. 
I. A TALE OF THREE THEORIES 
This Part aims to show that (1) each of the following theories 
demands a certain kind of constitutional legitimacy for the 
Constitution to have a claim to our obedience; (2) each demands an 
“original meaning” interpretation, independent from the question of 
constitutional legitimacy; and yet (3) each requires a different 
interpretive method as a result of its particular legitimacy theory, 
even though each claims that its hermeneutic derives solely from the 
text of the Constitution itself. The next Part will then show how, at 
least as originally understood by the Founders, the Constitution’s 
legitimacy was rooted in grounds broader than those offered by 
these originalist theories, and thus interpreting the Constitution as 
an originalist may require broader hermeneutics. 
A. Libertarian Originalism 
1. Natural rights 
The “presumption of liberty” theory comes most famously from 
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Randy Barnett.10 In his work Restoring the Lost Constitution: The 
Presumption of Liberty, he argues that popular sovereignty is an 
inadequate basis for constitutional obedience: only a constitution 
that “contains adequate procedures” to protect natural rights can lay 
a claim to legitimacy and our obedience.11 He challenges the validity 
of several consent-based arguments, such as that we consent to the 
Constitution when we choose to vote, to reside in the country, not 
to revolt, and not to amend the Constitution.12 In short, that the 
Constitution was ratified by popular assemblies in the late 1780s 
makes no difference; indeed, it appears that even if the Constitution 
were formally abolished today and re-ratified with exactly the same 
text, then, assuming the Constitution was not just by Barnett’s 
conception, it would not provide any better reason for non-
consenting parties to adhere to its commands. 
While Barnett’s entire work is an attempt to persuade us that the 
Constitution would be legitimate—and demand our obedience—if it 
protected our natural rights, he explicitly acknowledges that the 
Constitution could also be legitimate based on some other 
conception of justice. What is certain is that it must be just by some 
conception. 13  Barnett attempts to get around this somewhat 
unsatisfying proposition—after all, what if someone doesn’t agree 
with his conception?—by claiming that his theory does not depend 
on what conception of justice one holds; rather, “constitutional 
legitimacy can be seen as a product of procedural assurances that 
legal commands are not unjust.”14 He then argues, however, that it 
is only legitimate to bind non-consenting residents if their natural 
rights are protected.15 Thus, it is still unclear why the Constitution 
ought to be binding on those who do not share his natural-rights 
view of justice. 
 
 10. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY (2004). 
 11. Id. at 4; see also id. at 11–52. 
 12. Id. at 14–25. 
 13. Id. at 3 (“Although my thesis concerning legitimacy does depend on the claim that 
‘justice’ is independent of whatever may happen to be commanded by positive law, it does not 
depend on acceptance of any particular conception of justice.”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 4 (“I contend that if a constitution contains adequate procedures to protect 
these natural rights, it can be legitimate even if it was not consented to by everyone; and one 
that lacks adequate procedures to protect natural rights is illegitimate even if it was consented 
to by a majority.”). 
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Richard Epstein takes essentially the same view of constitutional 
legitimacy as Barnett.16 He begins with abandoning consent (or 
popular sovereignty) as the justification for obedience to the state. 
He writes that Locke was acutely aware of the problem of achieving 
unanimous consent for the formation of civil society out of the state 
of nature, and thus Locke adopted a view of tacit consent: anyone 
who does not leave, and who enjoys the protection of the state, 
tacitly consents to be ruled by the state.17 This was an error, writes 
Epstein, because tacit consent “becomes the thin edge of the wedge 
that grants legislators the lion’s share of the surplus that Lockean 
institutions wish to keep out of their hands.”18 
Thus, Epstein argues, to make the Lockean, natural-rights 
conception of the state viable, we must abandon tacit consent and 
any possibility of consent as a source of contractual (or 
constitutional) obligation. That obligation must come instead from a 
theory of exchange between the sovereign and the individual: 
The bulwark of the individual is . . . that whenever any portion of 
[his property] is taken from him, he must receive from the state . . . 
some equivalent or greater benefit as part of the same transaction. 
The categorical command that property shall not be taken without 
tacit consent [the Lockean theory] must therefore be rewritten to 
provide that property may be taken upon provision of just 
compensation.19 
Epstein then argues that this Lockean conception of natural 
rights and the end of the state “was dominant at the time when the 
Constitution was adopted,”20 and the substantive and procedural 
protections of the Constitution aimed at the protection of private 
property.21 Both Epstein and Barnett, therefore, abandon any notion 
of consent of the governed as legitimating constitutional obedience; 
both require that the Constitution protect natural rights (and 
especially property rights) in order for it to be legitimate and 
demand our adherence. 
 
 16. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985). 
 17. Id. at 14. 
 18. Id. at 14–15. 
 19. Id. at 15. 
 20. Id. at 16. 
 21. Id. at 17. 
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2. Writtenness 
Originalism neither self-evidently nor necessarily follows our 
acceptance of the constitution’s legitimacy. For Barnett, we must 
adhere to the original meaning because a written text requires such a 
reading.22 The “writtenness” of the text and its substance are two 
different things; again, if the substance of the constitutional text did 
not enable legitimate lawmaking, then the Constitution is not 
binding.23 Analogizing to contract law, Barnett argues that writing 
serves evidentiary, cautionary, channeling, and clarification functions, 
and that creating a written constitution is valuable for precisely these 
reasons. 24 The use of the parol evidence rule in contracts also 
suggests that interpreting written instruments requires adherence to 
original meaning; otherwise, parties could contradict the explicit 
provisions of the contract with additional evidence outside of the 
written contract. That would undermine the four functional 
purposes served by the writing and would require the difficult 
enterprise of reading the minds of the parties.25 The same holds true 
of constitutions.26 
Epstein’s book is not a justification for originalism, and he 
dispenses with matters of interpretation rather quickly. “[T]he idea 
that constitutions must evolve to meet changing circumstances,” he 
writes, “is an invitation to destroy the rule of law. If the next 
generation can do what it wants, why bother with a constitution to 
begin with, when it is only an invitation for perpetual revision?”27 
Whether the eminent domain clause—the primary focus of his book 
Takings—was meant to protect markets, autonomy, or both, does 
not matter; instead, “greater progress will be made by assuming that 
the clause is designed to do what it says, to ensure that private 
property is not taken for public use without just compensation.”28 
Epstein does not care for the intent of the Framers with respect to 
 
 22. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 100–09. 
 23. Id. at 109. 
 24. Id. at 101–02. 
 25. Id. at 102–03. 
 26. Or at least he argues that the same holds true. It is not entirely clear that 
constitutions—the fundamental social contract— are the same as normal contracts, or should 
be treated like normal contracts. Cf. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 522 (2003). 
 27. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 24. 
 28. Id. at 26. 
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specific constitutional provisions, but he is an originalist insofar as he 
is a textualist who does not accept “perpetual revision” of the 
Constitution’s text.29 Thus, both Epstein and Barnett adhere to 
original meaning based on the writtenness of the text or simply 
because a constitution would not be a constitution if the text were 
changeable. 
3. The presumption of liberty 
It is from the text itself and its original meaning that both 
Epstein and Barnett claim to derive their understanding of the 
Constitution’s substance. Barnett argues that if the text of the 
various constitutional provisions is properly understood, it points to 
interpretations that may be described as a presumption of liberty.30 
More specifically, he argues that when properly understood, the 
Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Ninth 
Amendment, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment all enshrine this presumption.31 The gist of 
this hermeneutic is that it “would place the burden on the 
government to show why its interference with liberty is both 
necessary and proper rather than . . . imposing a burden on the 
citizen to show why the exercise of a particular liberty is a 
‘fundamental right.’”32 The textual source for this hermeneutic is the 
Ninth Amendment’s protection for all liberty interests, not merely 
fundamental ones, and the constitutional command that all laws 
passed by Congress shall be both necessary and proper.33 Barnett 
 
 29. Larry Alexander also describes this as originalist. See Larry Alexander, Takings of 
Property and Constitutional Serendipity, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 223, 225 (1986). 
 30. The clearest statement that indicates that Barnett derives this presumption from the 
original meaning appears on page 154, where he writes that “[t]he original meaning of these 
nearly lost clauses [Necessary & Proper, Privileges or Immunities, and the Ninth Amendment] 
argues strongly against a presumption of constitutionality and in favor of the contrary 
construction I describe in chapter 10: the Presumption of Liberty.” BARNETT, supra note 10, 
at 154. 
 31. Id. at 5; see also id. at 153–55 (Necessary and Proper Clause); id. at 191–93 
(Privileges or Immunities Clause); id. at 225–26 (Ninth Amendment); id. at 278–321 
(Commerce Clause); id. at 259–60 (“Instead of authorizing a search for particular rights, the 
Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause can be viewed as establishing a 
general Presumption of Liberty, which places the burden on the government to establish the 
necessity and propriety of any infringement on individual freedom.”). 
 32. Id. at 262. 
 33. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2015 5:59 PM 
819 The Original Understanding of Constitutional Legitimacy 
 829 
does not, at least consciously, impose the presumption of liberty on 
the text in order to make the Constitution more just; these 
constitutional clauses, when given this correct original meaning, are 
also just, and so the Constitution is also legitimate and worthy of our 
obedience. 
Epstein’s whole work on takings, our main source for his views 
on constitutional interpretation, is meant to encourage the judiciary 
to strike down far more government legislation than it currently 
does34 by treating almost any government action that harms property 
values as a taking. 35  To be sure, Epstein does not care for 
presumptions. Rather, he writes that the principles he espouses 
emerge from the constitutional text itself.36 One could certainly 
argue, however, that Epstein’s approach effectively amounts to a 
presumption of liberty when it comes to economic regulation, or at 
least a presumption of liberty with a presumption of compensation if 
our property rights (and the liberty we are allowed to exercise as a 
result of those property rights) are taken away.37 Indeed, Epstein has 
recently completed a larger work, The Classical Liberal Constitution, 
in which he admits that the constitutional text is in fact vague and 
we must therefore interpret it with particular background 
principles.38 He claims that classical liberalism (which is essentially 
consistent with modern libertarianism) is indeed the proper choice 
 
 34. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 30–31 (“In what follows I shall advocate a level of 
judicial intervention far greater than we now have, and indeed far greater than we ever have 
had.”). 
 35. He argues, for example, that Supreme Court decisions refusing to grant 
compensation to riparians, who are denied access by government action to flowing waters on 
their lands, were wrongly decided, id. at 70–72; that government restrictions on the power to 
sell private property, condemnation of leasehold interests without the right of renewal, and 
interference with goodwill all require compensation, id. at 74–86; that any interference with 
contracts requires compensation, id. at 90–92; and that all taxes and regulation affecting the 
possession, use, and disposition of private property are takings, id. at 100–01. 
 36. Id. at 30; cf. id. at 31 (“[A]t no point does the argument depend upon a belief in 
judicial activism in cases of economic liberties. Instead I believe that the courses indicated are 
necessary implications derived from the constitutional text and the underlying theory of the 
state that it embodies.”). 
 37. Larry Alexander summarizes Epstein’s interpretive theory thus: “In brief, Epstein 
argues that the takings clause of the Constitution, properly interpreted, proscribes the 
destruction (= takings) of any right in the bundle of property rights enforceable at common 
law against private individuals or groups (= property), except insofar as public goods are 
realizable and overall wealth can be increased (= public use), and then only if all share pro rata 
in the increase in wealth (= just compensation).” Alexander, supra note 29, at 224. 
 38. RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 52–53 (2014). 
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for interpretation because it was the most significant moral theory at 
work during the Founding era. He concludes: “In its enduring 
provisions, our Constitution is most emphatically a classical liberal 
document. Its successful interpretation on all points dealing with text 
and its surrounding norms should be read in sync with the tradition of 
strong property rights, voluntary association, and limited 
government.”39 His Lockean theory of legitimacy requires a particular 
hermeneutic when interpreting the text of the Constitution. 
To summarize: (1) both Barnett’s and Epstein’s theories depend 
not on consent of the governed to legitimate constitutional 
obedience, but on the concept of natural rights; (2) they both rely 
on original meaning; and (3) their textual analyses require 
hermeneutics that are significantly more libertarian, and such 
hermeneutics derive at least in part from their theories of legitimacy. 
B. Progressive Originalism 
We now come to the second grouping of constitutional theories. 
The label “progressive presumption” or the more specific label 
“presumption of democratic legitimacy” has not been applied to 
these theories before, and perhaps for good reason. While the great 
progressive theorists of the last three decades have all tried to justify 
their constitutional theories by appealing to some notion of 
democratic legitimacy, one could argue that the progressive versions 
of democratic legitimacy invariably justify unpopular Supreme Court 
decisions. 
If nothing else, however, characterizing these theories under this 
presumption conveys how these theorists purport to make the 
Constitution more democratically legitimate by “enabling” or 
“enhancing” democracy. That also allows us to see how their 
particular view of legitimacy seems to require a particular 
 
 39. Id. at 53–54. Michael Rappaport describes Epstein’s theory as follows: “He believes 
that the constitutional language should be given its original meaning, but that the language is 
often incomplete or vague. Therefore, he argues that the language must be interpreted in 
accordance with some background principles, and those are classical liberal principles, because 
the leading political theory at the time of the Constitution was classical liberalism. As a result, 
[Epstein] is able to argue that the Constitution’s originalism meaning leads largely to classical 
liberalism.” Michael Rappaport, Richard Epstein on “Constitutionalism, Originalism, and 
Libertarianism,” ORIGINALISM BLOG (Feb. 21, 2013), http://originalismblog.typepad.com
/the-originalism-blog/2013/02/richard-epstein-on-constitutionalism-originalism-and-
libertarianismmike-rappaport.html. 
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hermeneutic. This Part will address one prominent progressive, 
originalist scholar, as well as one non-originalist, progressive thinker 
who has originalist tendencies. 
Jack Balkin, the most recent “progressive presumption” theorist, 
lays out his theory in his book, Living Originalism.40 He argues that 
if one properly understands the Framers’ intent and also the 
language and structure of the Constitution, then an originalist 
understanding of the Constitution leads to living constitutionalism.41 
To Balkin, a living constitutionalist is the true originalist. Balkin’s 
fundamental argument is that the Constitution is written in three 
separate kinds of clauses—rules, standards, and principles. While the 
constitutional rules are fixed (such as the requirement that the 
President be at least thirty-five years of age), the Framers left the 
text’s standards and especially its principles to be fleshed out by 
future generations. 42  Balkin argues that, as a consequence, the 
Framers intended the Constitution to enable politics—that is, to 
enable future generations to put their own glosses on the 
Constitution—rather than to constrain them to avoid, as Justice 
Scalia and others have said,43 the possible rotting of American society 
and politics. 
Balkin thus starts on the same ground as the libertarian-
originalists, arguing that we must obey the Constitution as originally 
understood. He also argues for this proposition on the ground of the 
text’s writtenness. 44  His explanation is less complicated than 
Barnett’s, and even seems rather intuitive. He writes that to maintain 
the framework of the Constitution over time “we must preserve the 
 
 40. BALKIN, supra note 3. 
 41. Though the argument that the Framers may not have intended for their “intent” to 
guide the future has been made several times. See, e.g., Paul A. Brest, The Misconceived Quest 
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 216 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). Contra John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of 
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 788–93 (2009). 
 42. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 6–7; see id. at 24 (“[The] basic job [of constitutions] is not 
to prevent future decision-making but to enable it.”). 
 43. See Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40–41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 44. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 35–49; id. at 35 (“Constitutional interpretation in the 
United States requires that we look to original meaning because the American Constitution is 
a written legal text that constitutes a framework for governance.”). 
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meaning of the words that constitute the framework.”45 Or, “[t]o 
stick to the plan and implement it, we must respect its particular 
choices about freedom and constraint for political actors . . . .”46 
Furthermore, “[i]f we do not attempt to preserve legal meaning over 
time, then we will not be following the written Constitution as our 
plan but instead will be following a different plan.”47 Whether or not 
this is a rigorous justification for an originalist interpretation, it is 
clear that Balkin presumes it as a starting ground. He claims to 
separate the question of how we should interpret the Constitution 
from whether we should actually obey it and keep it as our plan for 
government.48 
Balkin makes the case for fidelity to the Constitution by avoiding 
the problem of consent-as-legitimacy in a new way. He argues that 
each generation gives its ongoing consent by debating constitutional 
construction. He writes that over time “Americans try to persuade 
each other about the best meaning of constitutional text and 
principle in current circumstances. These debates and political 
struggles also help generate Americans’ investment in the 
Constitution as their Constitution, even if they never officially 
consented to it . . . .”49 He further argues, “[i]n every generation, 
We the People of the United States make the Constitution our own 
by calling upon its text and its principles and arguing about what 
they mean in our own time.”50 Thus, consent to the Constitution is 
an ongoing process that takes the shape of changing constitutional 
understandings. These constitutional constructions themselves are 
legitimate, Balkin claims, because of their responsiveness to 
democratic politics over time: “[T]he initial authority of the text 
comes from the fact that it was created through successive acts of 
popular sovereignty . . . . The authority of constitutional 
constructions, in turn, comes from their direct or long-run 
 
 45. Id. at 36. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 38 (“It is important to note that my argument for following original 
meaning assumes that Americans want to be faithful to the written Constitution as law and 
that we want to continue to accept it as our framework for governance. . . . Interpreting the 
text of the Constitution does not automatically require that we accept the written Constitution 
as a plan of governance.”). 
 49. Id. at 4. 
 50. Id. at 11. 
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responsiveness to popular will as expressed through the processes of 
democratic politics.”51 In short, the Constitution is premised on 
democracy and thus any constitutional theory must aim at 
democratic legitimacy. Balkin argues that his theory provides just 
such legitimacy because it is the very act of debating constitutional 
construction that makes the Constitution today “our law.”52 
We see, therefore, that, like his libertarian-originalist 
counterparts, Balkin relies on the original meaning of the 
Constitution, and he begins with a particular understanding of what 
the Constitution must allow for it to be legitimate: it must allow 
successive generations to put their own glosses on the constitutional 
text for it to be democratically legitimate and “our law.” Balkin 
further claims that his particular interpretation of the Constitution’s 
clauses flows from the original meaning of the text. Thus, he argues 
that the Framers intended for us continually to change how we 
interpret the standards and principles in the text.53 Of course, such a 
view runs directly contrary to Barnett’s libertarian-originalist thesis 
that the Constitution was meant primarily to protect individuals 
from future decision-making by enshrining their rights—and thus a 
presumption of liberty—into the constitutional text. Balkin draws 
the precise opposite conclusion than does Barnett from the open-
endedness of the Constitution’s grand rights provisions with respect 
to the correct constitutional hermeneutic.54 
 
 51. Id. at 55. 
 52. Id. at 69–73; see also id. at 64–73; id. at 71 (“The democratic legitimacy of the 
Constitution depends on the people’s belief that their Constitution and their government 
belongs to them, so that if they speak and protest and make their views known over time, the 
constitutional construction of courts and the political branches will eventually respond to their 
political values and to the issues they care about most.”). Balkin elaborates on this kind of 
legitimacy toward the end of his book. He insists that watershed cases such as Brown v. Board 
of Education or the sexual equality cases of the 1970s followed on the heels of democratic and 
social movements, and thus his version of “democratic constitutionalism” is in fact 
democratically legitimate. See id. at 320–25. 
 53. Cf. id. at 25 (“This choice of [vague and abstract] language [of principles] makes 
little sense if the purpose of constitutionalism is to strongly constrain future decisionmaking.”); 
id. at 29 (“Open-ended rights guarantees . . . . are designed to channel and discipline future 
political judgment, not forestall it.” (emphasis in original)). See generally id. at 21–34. 
 54. Though Balkin claims that living constitutionalism follows from originalism, he 
really seems to rely on the two ideas separately. Thus he claims that living constitutionalism is 
appropriate because the courts are responsive to democratic politics in the long run. This is 
what makes the Constitution legitimate. He explains that Brown v. Board of Education was in 
fact responsive to existing democratic and social movements, as were the sexual equality cases 
in the 1970s; even Heller was responsive to the guns rights movements of the last two decades. 
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To summarize: Balkin’s constitutional theory (1) requires a 
constitution that allows for updating the text so that it can be “our 
law” and thus democratically legitimate; (2) begins with the original 
meaning of the text based on the Constitution’s writtenness; and (3) 
arrives at a hermeneutic of living originalism that is consistent with 
his view of the requirements for constitutional legitimacy. 
Insofar as Balkin tries to develop a theory that will be 
democratically legitimate, he follows in the footsteps of at least one 
great progressive constitutional theorist, John Hart Ely.55 Ely does not 
pretend to be originalist, but he did claim to rely on the original 
meaning of the Constitution when it suited his argument. His 
hermeneutic seems to depend on his particular ground for legitimacy. 
Ely wrote his famous Democracy and Distrust in 1980, in which 
he rejects the possibility of discovering fundamental values to 
supplement the open-ended texture of the Constitution’s clauses.56 
Nevertheless, the text is still open-ended; something has to 
supplement it. Ely argues that the Court could interpret these 
provisions to provide better process for democratic decision making; 
this would include “clearing the channels of political change on the 
one hand, and . . . correcting certain kinds of discrimination against 
minorities on the other,” as the Warren Court had done.57 Such a 
“representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review, unlike its 
rival value-protecting approach, is not inconsistent with, but on the 
contrary (and quite by design) entirely supportive of, the underlying 
premises of the American system of representative democracy.”58 
The crucial problem is that while Ely recognizes both that the 
constitutional text needs supplementation and that it would be 
impossible to discover substantive values to provide that 
supplementation, he somehow believes that his process-oriented view 
is itself not a value judgment. In other words, he is not really so 
different from those scholars he disavows for seeking to vindicate 
 
But he does not once mention Roe v. Wade as being legitimated by a long-run responsiveness 
to democratic politics. Roe is justified strictly by his original meaning approach. It thus appears 
that he is willing to use one or the other approach—originalism or his conception of living 
constitutionalism—to justify the doctrinal results. 
 55. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). 
 56. Id. at 43–72. 
 57. Id. at 74. 
 58. Id. at 88. 
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substantive values. By choosing to emphasize representation and 
process, he ignores the very real possibility that the Constitution did 
mean to protect some kind of substantive rights as well. Ely is far too 
careful to have missed this criticism, and he addresses it several times 
in his book. He admits that “our Constitution is too complex a 
document to lie still for any pat characterization.” 59  Yet Ely’s 
problem is that he does characterize the Constitution as 
overwhelmingly focused on process and representation, arguing not 
only from the structure of the text but also from selective writings of 
the Founders.60 
An example may better illustrate. Ely acknowledges that our 
Constitution “has always been substantially concerned with 
preserving liberty,” but he argues the relevant question is “how that 
concern has been pursued.”61 Yet immediately preceding this claim, 
he suggests that the few genuinely substantive provisions in the 
Constitution have been unsuccessful. He correctly argues that the 
substantive value of slavery and prohibition did not survive because 
of subsequent repeal; but he also argues that two other substantive 
values—the right to bear arms and the freedom to contract, which 
“at least arguably were placed beyond the reach of the political 
process”—were in fact “‘repealed’ by judicial construction.”62 He 
concludes: “Maybe in fact our forebears did not intend very seriously 
to protect those values, but the fact that the Court, in the face of 
what must be counted at least plausible contrary arguments, so 
readily read these values out of the Constitution is itself instructive of 
American expectation of a constitution.”63 
But Ely’s claims are susceptible to the same criticism as the other 
theories examined thus far. His theory accounts for the decisions 
limiting these substantive rights, but that hardly means the original 
understanding of the Constitution was that these rights should be 
 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 101 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 92 (“[M]y claim is only that 
the original Constitution was principally, indeed I would say overwhelmingly, dedicated to 
concerns of process and structure and not to the identification and preservation of specific 
substantive values. Any claim that it was exclusively so conceived would be ridiculous . . . . And 
indeed there are other provisions in the original document that seem almost entirely value-
oriented, though my point, of course, is that they are few and far between.”). 
 60. See id. at 88–93. 
 61. Id. at 100. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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read out by the Court. Ely begins with a pre-commitment to 
representation as a source of constitutional legitimacy. True, Ely is 
not known for pretending that his proposal for constitutional 
interpretation derives from the original meaning of the text.64 Yet 
even he relies on original meaning when it suits his argument65—and 
this meaning seems to depend on his pre-commitment. He writes, 
for example, that “[t]he original Constitution’s more pervasive 
strategy . . . can be loosely styled a strategy of pluralism”; that “the 
concept of representation . . . had been at the core of our 
Constitution from the beginning”; that the colonists were mainly 
concerned with representative fairness; and that “the original 
Constitution was principally, indeed I would say overwhelmingly, 
dedicated to concerns of process and structure and not to the 
identification and preservation of specific substantive values.”66 To 
be sure, he hedges: the Constitution was not exclusively concerned 
with process, he writes.67 Yet even he admits that “[o]n [his] more 
expansive days,” he is tempted to claim that his view “represents the 
ultimate interpretivism” (basically originalism). 68  Ultimately, he 
seems to settle on the proposition that it really doesn’t matter 
whether his approach is interpretivist or not.69 
In sum, Ely arrives at a particular constitutional hermeneutic that 
hinges on his view of constitutional legitimacy and which, he claims, 
is largely consistent with the original understanding of the 
constitutional text. 
C. Conservative Originalism 
The last group of constitutional thinkers consists of originalists 
whom we may also deem judicial minimalists. The first originalists 
were mainly of this stripe, as originalism had its beginnings as a 
revolt against the perceived judicial overreach of the Warren Court.70 
 
 64. The first part of his book, after all, is a refutation that “interpretivism”—which in 
the language of the day was essentially (though not entirely) equivalent to originalism—is 
possible. See id. at 11–14, 41. 
 65. For his analysis on the original meaning and purpose of the Constitution, see id. at 
80–82, 87–88 & footnote, 88–101. 
 66. Id. at 80, 82, 89, 92. 
 67. Id. at 92. 
 68. Id. at 87–88. 
 69. Id. at footnote on 88. 
 70. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principles, or Are 
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It is important to stress that the “presumption of constitutionality” is 
not usually a label applied to originalist thinkers because there is such 
a wide variety of originalists. Much of the scholarship providing 
descriptive accounts of originalism focuses on the evolution of 
originalism from “original intentions” originalism to “original public 
meaning,” to “original understanding,” and now to a “hypothetical 
reasonable person” originalism. 71  Nevertheless, this presumption 
again helps to clarify the pre-commitments of these originalist 
thinkers. 
1. Popular Sovereignty 
Originalists who adhere to judicial minimalism and this 
presumption argue that we owe obedience to the Constitution and 
adherence to its constraints because the people themselves imposed 
these constraints. As Michael McConnell has written, “The people’s 
representatives have a right to govern, so long as they do not 
transgress limits on their authority that are fairly traceable to the 
constitutional precommitments of the people themselves, as reflected 
directly through text and history, or indirectly through longstanding 
practice and precedent.”72 Justice Scalia’s adherence to the original 
public understanding of the constitutional text evinces a similar 
commitment to popular sovereignty: it is because the people 
themselves have imposed certain constraints on the future that those 
constraints are binding.73 These are views of popular sovereignty that 
the previous two schools of thought have rejected. 
Keith Whittington gives a comprehensive account of popular 
sovereignty as a ground for constitutional legitimacy,74 summarizing 
his view as follows: “By construing the Constitution in terms of the 
intent of its creators, originalism both enforces the authoritative 
 
They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 5, 21 (2011) 
(“[O]riginalism not only promised a more or less principled ground for opposing further 
liberal innovations, but also provided a potential justification for demands to roll back legal 
doctrines that had originated either in the Warren Court or ‘the New Deal settlement’ that 
marked the end of the Lochner era.”). 
 71. See supra note 5 for recent literature describing the evolution of originalism. 
 72. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment 
on Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Moral Reading’ of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1291 
(1996–1997). 
 73. See Scalia, supra note 43, at 38. 
 74. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 5, at 110–59. 
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decision of the people acting as sovereign and, equally important, 
preserves the possibility of similar higher-order decision making by 
the present and future generations of citizenry.”75 Whittington, like 
Barnett and Epstein, rejects the notion of tacit consent,76 but he 
claims that “We the People” give real consent each time we amend 
the Constitution, just as the founding generation gave its real 
consent when it ratified the Constitution. Whittington writes: 
Consensual government does not require the imagination of a 
current consent; rather, it requires that government receive 
authorization for its actions. The Constitution provides that 
authorization. Government action requiring different authorization 
would require another such expression of consent. The 
government was set in motion by consent, but it need not 
demonstrate our continuing consent in order to remain in motion. 
It is enough that it not change course, or even stop its motion, 
except by our new consent. The implication is that the founders 
initiated the Constitution, which remains valid and binding not by 
virtue of their right to govern over us but by virtue of the 
“historical accident” that their text is the most recent expression of 
consent.77 
Thus, Whittington adopts the view of “democratic dualism,” 
which maintains that the “people emerge at particular historical 
moments to deliberate on constitutional issues and to provide 
binding expressions of their will, which are to serve as fundamental 
law in the future when the sovereign is absent.”78 Dualism is the 
same approach Bruce Ackerman takes to justify adherence to the 
constitutional text, but Ackerman argues that the New Deal era was 
a period of higher lawmaking. He interprets the constitutional 
constructions of that era as the binding will of the people. 79 
 
 
 75. Id. at 111. 
 76. Id. at 129. 
 77. Id. at 133 (internal citations omitted). 
 78. Id. at 135. 
 79. This concept is developed in several of Ackerman’s writings, but for a rather 
comprehensive article, see Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 
YALE L.J. 453 (1989). 
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2. Intentionalism versus writtenness 
For Whittington, as with Balkin and Barnett, popular sovereignty 
does not necessarily dictate originalism. Whittington also argues that 
it is the writtenness of the Constitution that requires an adherence to 
originalism.80 But, he argues, just because the text is written does 
not mean it has a claim to our obedience; popular sovereignty 
justifies that obedience. 
Not all originalists believe that originalism follows from the 
writtenness of the constitutional text. 81  Initially, originalism 
arguments were often based on intentionalism. Intentionalism holds 
that the authority of a law always derives from the authority of the 
lawgiver, and thus the lawgiver’s intent is authoritative.82 Richard 
Kay has explained: “Legal obligations arise because we recognize 
law-making authority vested in certain human beings. It is to that 
exercise of human will in making the relevant law that we refer in 
statutory construction.”83 
Intentionalism offers a solution to the question of legitimacy—
we must obey because the intent of the Framers is authoritative. It 
also, however, solves the question of interpretation—it is the intent 
of the original lawgivers that matters, and thus we should be 
originalists. Unlike with the libertarian and progressive theories of 
legitimacy, which do not require originalism, a good argument can 
 
 80. He makes his case on three grounds: first, the break from Great Britain (which does 
not have a written constitution) and the decision to fix our rights and principles in a written 
text reveal that those rights and principles are permanent; second, that a written text needs to 
be stable in order to allow judicial enforcement; and third, written legal texts all carry the 
intent of their authors. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 
50. 
 81. I have hardly exhausted all theories of originalism based on language or writtenness. 
For some additional examples, see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English 
You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
967 (2004); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (2008) (unpublished manuscript 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. 
 82. See the discussion on this normative ground for originalism in Daniel A. Farber, The 
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1100–02 (1989). 
 83. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: 
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 232 (1988). Even John Hart Ely 
seemed to recognize that constitutional law in at least some sense requires us to know 
something about the original intentions of the Framers. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 55, at 16 
(“Unless we know whether ‘natural born’ meant born to American parents on the one hand or 
born to married parents on the other, we don’t know what the Ratifiers thought they were 
ratifying and thus what we should recognize as the constitutional command.”). 
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be made that originalism is required by intentionalism. While Kay 
argues that discovering the intent of the Ratifiers (or Framers) is no 
more difficult than any other historical investigation to which 
thousands of students of history commit themselves every year,84 this 
version of originalism has suffered the most serious of attacks.85 
However, this attribute of intentionalism—that it simultaneously 
solves the questions of legitimacy and interpretation—survives in 
some popular sovereignty theories. Even though Whittington relies 
on the text’s writtenness to justify originalism, many originalists 
seem to believe that originalism is justified on the basis of popular 
sovereignty alone. 86  The argument in the context of popular 
sovereignty is almost identical to the argument in the intentionalism 
context: If we obey the text because it is the will of the people 
themselves, then surely we should adhere to their will—that is, their 
original intentions. The only difference between this version of 
popular sovereignty and Richard Kay’s intentionalism is the identity 
of the lawgiver: for Kay it was the Framers, while for most 
originalists today it is the Ratifiers. 
 
 84. Kay, supra note 83, at 252 (“The very breadth of [the] claim [of the impossibility of 
historical understanding] makes it implausible. It is essentially an attack on the possibility and 
validity of historical investigation. While some students of history deny the possibility of 
objectively correct historical conclusions, the contrary view is also widely and firmly held. 
Indeed, the force of the latter position is strengthened by the fact that history is a well-
established discipline to which thousands of sensible people have devoted and continue to 
devote their energy and intelligence.”). 
 85. For general criticisms, see Farber, supra note 82, at 1102. The most widely cited 
critique of originalism on this ground—a critique thought to be fatal to the original intent 
originalists—was Paul Brest’s famous article. Brest, supra note 41. He argues that it is 
impossible to know the intent of the Framers or Ratifiers because it is too difficult to 
determine each person’s individual “intention-vote,” which can vary at different levels of 
generality. Id. at 209–17. 
 86. For a discussion of the general popular sovereignty rationales for originalism, see 
Farber, supra note 82, at 1097–1100. He summarizes: “The majoritarian argument for 
originalism has three premises: that our society’s ‘master norm’ is democracy; that the 
Constitution gets its legitimacy solely from the majority will as expressed at the time of 
enactment; and that judicial decisions are less ‘democratic’ than those of the elected branches 
of government.” Id. at 1098. More generally, some kind of popular sovereignty argument 
seems to be the most common justification for originalist interpretation. See Kurt T. Lash, 
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440 
(2007); Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
29, 39 (2011). For an argument that popular sovereignty cannot be the justification for 
originalism, but that originalism is justified nonetheless, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, The 
Misunderstood Relationship Between Originalism and Popular Sovereignty, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y, 485 (2008). 
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Of course, because this version of originalism requires a 
commitment to the popular sovereignty justification for 
constitutional legitimacy, the very necessity of originalism may thus 
be called into question if we dispute the popular sovereignty basis of 
the Constitution’s legitimacy.87 
Thus far, this subpart has shown the following: (1) These 
originalists believe that the Constitution is legitimate because it is 
based on the consent of the governed in past moments of 
constitutional decision making—a notion that their libertarian and 
progressive counterparts reject; and (2) They believe that originalism 
follows from the very nature of the written text or from 
intentionalism (whether we seek the intentions of the Framers or of 
the Ratifiers). 
3. Judicial minimalism and the presumption of constitutionality 
It remains to be shown that these originalists require a 
hermeneutic of judicial minimalism or a presumption of 
constitutionality. It is important, upfront, not to overstate the case: 
Originalism and judicial minimalism do not overlap perfectly. There 
might be good reasons to be a minimalist without being an 
originalist, and many originalists are not minimalists. Still, there is a 
class of judicial minimalists whose hermeneutic—the presumption of 
constitutionality—seems to derive from their commitment to the 
popular sovereignty justification for constitutional legitimacy. 
The presumption of constitutionality itself came most definitively 
from Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, in which he wrote that courts ought to, “in the exercise of 
their discretion, refuse an injunction unless the alleged invalidity” of 
 
 87. This challenge is all too common in the progressive literature, which argues that we 
have no duty to obey the decisions of past majorities, and often that the Constitution is not 
legitimate because different groups—such as minorities and women—were excluded from the 
ratifying process. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 41, at 225 (“Even if the adopters freely consented 
to the Constitution, however, this is not an adequate basis for continuing fidelity to the 
founding document, for their consent cannot bind succeeding generations. We did not adopt 
the Constitution, and those who did are dead and gone.”). See also id. at 230 (“The drafting, 
adopting, or amending of the Constitution may itself have suffered from defects of democratic 
process which detract from its moral claims. To take an obvious example, the interests of black 
Americans were not adequately represented in the adoption of the Constitution of 1787 or the 
fourteenth amendment.”). Note, however, that this is precisely Barnett’s position, too. See 
supra note 10 and accompanying text. I will explore how some of the Founders might have 
responded to these objections in Part II. 
02.WURMAN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2015 5:59 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
842 
a legislative act is clear.88 Brandeis cited several famous Justices, 
including Chief Justice John Marshall, for the proposition.89 Harvard 
Law professor James Thayer had written forty years earlier, in 1893, 
that the Supreme Court “can only disregard [an] Act when those 
who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, 
but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to 
rational question.” 90  This doctrine quickly became the tool of 
judicial progressives who wished to adopt the dissent’s position in 
Lochner v. New York and give deference to legislative judgments.91 
Robert Bork appropriated the presumption of constitutionality 
to originalism in a 1971 article92 that some claim to be originalism’s 
intellectual birth:93 “In Lochner, Justice Peckham, defending liberty 
from what he conceived as a mere meddlesome interference, asked, 
‘[A]re we all . . . at the mercy of legislative majorities?’ The correct 
answer, where the Constitution does not speak, must be ‘yes.’”94 
Bork also expressed this position with his (in)famous characterization 
of the Ninth Amendment as a provision obscured by an “ink blot.”95 
The bottom line for him (and subsequent judicial conservatives) was 
that Congress or the states may legislate freely except where the 
Constitution explicitly reserves a substantive right.96 
Though Bork is perhaps the most famous expositor of the 
presumption of constitutionality among judicial conservatives, other 
 
 88. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 354 (1936); see also McConnell, 
supra note 72, at 1289. 
 89. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 354–55. 
 90. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). 
 91. Cf. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 228–29. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), 
is the infamous case in which the Supreme Court struck down a New York law limiting the 
number of hours bakers were permitted to work in a day on the grounds that it infringed on 
the freedom to contract. Progressives and judicial minimalists attack the decision as being anti-
democratic. 
 92. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1 (1971). 
 93. Solum, supra note 81, at 13. 
 94. Bork, supra note 92, at 11. 
 95. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 236 (quoting Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 249 (1987) (statement of Robert H. Bork). 
 96. Judge Bork used this same inkblot language for the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating: “That clause has been a mystery since its adoption and 
in consequence has, quite properly, remained a dead letter.” ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 166 (1990). 
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originalists continue to adopt it as part of their constitutional views. 
Lino Graglia recently wrote: “[I]n a democracy the view of elected 
legislators should prevail over the view of unelected judges in cases 
of doubt,”97 and “if a judge does not know that the Constitution 
was understood to preclude a particular policy choice, his conclusion 
must be that the choice is not constitutionally precluded.”98 Michael 
McConnell has implied that the will of the people ought to be 
entitled to presumptive validity.99 Whittington also suggests that, at 
least as a descriptive matter, constitutional construction occurs 
through the decisions of political actors over time, perhaps (though 
not necessarily) implying that elected legislators and executives 
ought to have the power to flesh out textual indeterminacies 
according to their own preferences.100 Kurt Lash’s theory of the 
Ninth Amendment—which, he argues, reflects the Founders’ 
commitments to federalism and popular sovereignty—would lead to 
a presumption that state legislative acts that restrict rights are 
constitutional.101 
Graglia complains most about the Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that giving the Court such 
“unlimited policymaking power” through the words “due process” 
and “equal protection”102 deprives the American people “of their 
most important constitutional right—the right to self-
government.”103 From these arguments we see how the judicial 
 
 97. Lino A. Graglia, Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide 
the Answer?, 34 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 73, 75 (2011). 
 98. Id. at 86. 
 99. McConnell, supra note 72, at 1291. 
 100. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 3–9, 15–19 (1999). It is important to emphasize 
that it is unclear from Whittington’s descriptive account whether he actually supports some 
kind of “presumption of constitutionality” as the ideal construction. 
 101. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, On Federalism, Freedom, and the Founders’ View of Retained 
Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 969, 972 (2008) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment was meant to 
give states discretion with respect to “retained rights”); Kurt T. Lash, Of Inkblots and 
Originalism: Historical Ambiguity and the Case of the Ninth Amendment, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 467, 472 (2008) (“The proper stance of an originalist judge in the face of 
historical ambiguity, then, is one of humility. If the original meaning of the text remains 
obscured, then courts lack authority to use the text to interfere with the political process. Put 
another way, in a case of historical ambiguity, the very legitimacy of judicial review is 
obscured—as if by an inkblot.”). 
 102. Graglia, supra note 97, at 76–77. 
 103. Id. at 85. 
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minimalists differ from the libertarian-originalists: the latter want to 
see more democratically enacted laws struck down as violations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and other rights provisions, whereas the 
former want to see even fewer struck down. And the difference of 
emphasis derives from different views of constitutional legitimacy: do 
we prefer our right to self-government, or being secure in our 
natural rights? 
It is worth spelling out how the presumption of constitutionality 
easily follows from this view of constitutional legitimacy: if the only 
reason to be bound by the text is that it is clothed with the consent 
of the people in a past time, then when that past consent is unclear 
we should be governed by clear expressions of contemporary consent. 
The underlying theory is one of popular sovereignty, where the 
people govern today except where the people themselves withdrew 
their power of self-government in the past.104 
To be sure, many originalists do not follow the steps I have 
outlined in this section.105 And even those who would adopt some 
kind of presumption of constitutionality do so as but one part of 
their constitutional interpretation, and for many subtle and complex 
reasons.106 Nevertheless, the Court still applies a robust presumption 
of constitutionality when it comes to rational basis inquiries, leading 
at least one scholar to write that the Court should apply such a 
presumption to legislative interpretations of the Constitution as 
well.107 The theorists described above, moreover, represent a wide 
 
 104. McConnell has argued that this presumption in part reflects a commitment to 
popular sovereignty. McConnell, supra note 72, at 1289–90. Nevertheless, as he demonstrates, 
such a presumption has many “subtle” justifications, including not only popular sovereignty, 
but also compromise and accommodation, flexibility and experimentation, institutional 
differences, and judicial humility more generally. Id. 
 105. For example, Whittington writes that the “new originalists” of the past two decades 
are “less likely to emphasize a primary commitment to judicial restraint,” and many “are clear 
that a commitment to originalism is distinct from a commitment to judicial deference and that 
originalism may often require the active exercise of the power of judicial review in order to 
keep faith with the principled commitments of the founding.” Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 608–09 (2004). 
 106. Recall, for example, McConnell’s statement that not only text and history, but also 
longstanding practice and precedent, may restrain current majorities. See McConnell, supra 
note 72 and accompanying text. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson also seems to be this kind of 
minimalist. His judicial minimalism does not derive from originalism, but from a strong belief 
in judicial fallibility and the necessity of judicial humility. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON, COSMIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO 
SELF-GOVERNANCE 6–8 (2012). 
 107. See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE 
DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2015 5:59 PM 
819 The Original Understanding of Constitutional Legitimacy 
 845 
range of old and new originalists. Finally, Barnett sees the 
presumption of constitutionality as the nemesis of the presumption 
of liberty.108 
4. Alternatives to judicial minimalism 
Still, it is important not to overstate the case. There are many 
originalists who genuinely wish to interpret the Constitution with a 
much broader hermeneutic. Some of these originalists, such as 
McGinnis and Rappaport, go so far as claiming that we no longer 
need any construction—that the Constitution, when interpreted 
using original interpretive conventions, will always come up with the 
most probable answer.109 
There is also a middle position. As McConnell argues, though 
originalism will give the answer to many constitutional questions, at 
least in some cases it cannot dictate one correct answer, but rather a 
range of possible meanings. It is within this range that he claims to 
be a judicial minimalist.110 John O. McGinnis shows that as an 
originalist matter, the Founders were not judicial minimalists and did 
not adhere to Thayer’s presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, 
the proper role of judicial restraint in an original interpretive 
conventions approach, which is similar to McConnell’s position, may 
be described as follows: 
The first obligation of a justice is to use the rich array of legal 
methods and mechanisms to clarify the meaning of ambiguous or 
vague text. A jurist does not simply defer to any plausible meaning 
of the text, considered in isolation from the rest of the text of the 
Constitution or clarifying legal methods. Only if these kinds of 
analyses fail to clarify whether the legislation is based on the correct 
meaning of the constitution, should the judiciary defer to the 
legislature.111 
 
DAME L. REV. 1447 (2010). 
 108. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 151–52. He also claims that “no group has been more 
faithful” than “modern judicial conservatives” to this presumption. Id. at 233–35. 
 109. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 41, at 772–73 
 110. Conversation with Michael W. McConnell, Professor, Stanford Law School, in 
Stanford Law School (2012). 
 111. John O. McGinnis, Is Judicial Deference Part of the Originalist Method? 52 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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Michael Stokes Paulsen adopts a similar approach: “If the 
meaning of the words of the Constitution supplies a sufficiently 
determinate legal rule or standard applicable to the case at hand, that 
rule or standard must prevail over a contrary rule supplied by some 
other competing source of law.” 112  But if the meaning of the 
language is indeterminate or under-determinate when applied to a 
specific case, then typically the “political decisions made by an 
imperfect representative democracy” can prevail.113 
There is a vibrant originalist literature over the past few years 
that rejects judicial minimalism. These constitutional theorists have 
attempted to distinguish between legitimacy and interpretation; that 
is, their methods of interpretation do not obviously follow from their 
commitment to popular sovereignty or to some other theory of 
legitimacy. 114 Libertarian and progressive theorists, on the other 
hand, adopt hermeneutics—the presumption of liberty or the 
progressive presumption—that seem inextricably linked to the 
theorists’ understandings of legitimacy. Many conservative judicial 
minimalists, further, also adopt a hermeneutic—the presumption of 
constitutionality—that appears to flow from their understanding of 
legitimacy. But many originalists today offer a different approach. 
D. Narrow Theories of Constitutional Legitimacy 
What this Part has aimed to show is that each of these schools of 
originalist constitutional interpretation—the libertarian-originalist 
school, the progressive school, and the conservative judicial-
 
 112. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 
YALE L.J. 2037, 2057 (2006). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Gary Lawson identified the problem of conflating legitimacy and interpretation in a 
famous law review article comparing constitutional interpretation to interpreting a fried 
chicken recipe. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 
1825 (1997). “Modern theories of constitutional interpretation,” wrote Lawson, “typically 
make the truth of propositions about constitutional meaning depend, at least to some degree, 
on the extent to which those propositions [] lead to politically legitimate results.” Id. at 1823. 
He added that this approach to constitutional interpretation is “completely backwards”: “The 
Constitution’s legitimacy and consistency with modern practice depend on the meaning of the 
Constitution; the Constitution’s meaning does not generally depend on its legitimacy or on 
current practice.” Id. Lawrence B. Solum also explicitly begins with a semantic and linguistic 
interpretation of the constitutional text (his “fixation” and “clause meaning” theses), and only 
then asserts his “fidelity” thesis—that we have good reasons to affirm our fidelity to the 
Constitution because it leads to good consequences and the “rule of law.” Solum, supra note 
81. 
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minimalist school—focuses on one theory of legitimacy, whether it 
be securing natural rights, enabling or enhancing democratic 
decision making, or popular sovereignty. Each then also claims to 
adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution, but each 
school’s understanding of that original meaning seems to require a 
hermeneutic that depends at least in part on its theory of 
constitutional legitimacy. 
The problem therefore becomes evident: The original meaning or 
proper constitutional hermeneutic as each school understands it may 
be too narrow. Indeed, it is not at all clear, for example, that the best 
way to interpret the Constitution is to presume constitutionality 
except where the Constitution speaks explicitly. Barnett does seem 
correct that the Framers of the Ninth Amendment must have meant 
something by its inclusion, and that it does, therefore, have some 
original meaning to which we must adhere.115 Further, how could the 
Equal Protection Clause ever speak explicitly, unless we adopt the 
original-expected-application version of originalism which many 
originalists no longer espouse? 116  Barnett and Balkin are on to 
something when both use the open-endedness of the abstract rights 
provisions to develop their theories—even if they come to different 
conclusions about what those provisions mean. The point is that the 
people themselves may not have intended to be so strict with the 
constitutional text: they might have written into the Constitution 
more open-ended standards and principles with the expectation that 
the courts and the people would interpret them differently over time. 
To be sure, any of these theorists may respond that their 
presumptions are simply constructions to be used when semantic 
meaning cannot resolve a question. In other words, all might claim 
to be “originalists,” and simply disagree on what construction to use 
when the original meaning is not clear. Still, these theorists run into 
the same problem insofar as they claim that their constructions 
derive from the original meaning of the Constitution or the original 
intent of the Framers. All of the theorists analyzed in this Article 
 
 115. BARNETT, supra note 10, at xii. 
 116. While many no longer espouse that version of originalism, others still do. See Fallon, 
supra note 70, at 9–11 (describing the different views on “original expected applications” 
originalism). Also, recall Bork’s view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Bork, supra 
note 92. 
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explicitly claim that their interpretive methods stem from the original 
meaning of the Constitution’s various provisions. 
Even if the theories did not purport to rely on original meaning 
to determine the proper construction, they would still run into a 
problem if their constructions derive—as this Article has argued—
from particular understandings of constitutional legitimacy that we 
may not find persuasive for one reason or another. Even if these 
scholars admit, in other words, that they merely prefer their 
particular constructions for no other reason than because those 
constructions are more consistent with their understanding of 
constitutional legitimacy, we may not personally be persuaded by the 
natural rights, progressive, or popular sovereignty theories of 
legitimacy. It is thus unclear why we should adopt these particular 
constructions rather than the constructions that the founding 
generation would have used,117 if we find the Founders’ theory of 
legitimacy more persuasive. 
Part II will show that if we agree that the Constitution ought to 
be interpreted by the original meaning—a point on which Barnett, 
Bork, and Balkin all ostensibly agree—then we ought to move away 
from strictly adhering to any of the grand, yet narrow, constitutional 
theories, and also the presumption of constitutionality which does a 
disservice to the more open-ended provisions of the constitutional 
text. More specifically, the next Part will challenge each theory’s 
understanding of constitutional legitimacy by arguing that, at least as 
the Founders understood constitutional legitimacy, the Constitution 
would have to be legitimate in each of the three ways these theories 
have advanced. 
II. THE FOUNDERS ON FOUNDING 
The claim in this Part is narrow: that the Founders understood 
constitutional legitimacy in all three ways described in Part I. Thus, 
broader constitutional hermeneutics may be necessary as an 
originalist matter, if we assume that the text of the Constitution was 
designed to effectuate its purposes and create a legitimate regime. If 
we assume that the various hermeneutics are merely constructions 
and not derived from original meaning, then we may still desire a 
 
 117. McGinnis and Rappaport argue that as an originalist matter, the founding generation 
did have particular interpretive conventions that we could adopt today. Thus, construction as we 
know it today would be unnecessary. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 41. 
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broader hermeneutic insofar as we find the Founders’ understanding 
of constitutional legitimacy more persuasive than any understanding 
put forward by the schools described in this Article. Indeed, this Part 
claims that if we are unpersuaded by the natural rights theory, the 
progressive theory, or the popular sovereignty theory on their own 
terms, then perhaps prudence can still justify adherence to the 
whole. This is what James Madison seems to suggest in his 
understudied response to Jefferson’s “dead hand of the past” 
argument. 
As stated in the introduction, understanding the Founders’ own 
views on constitutional legitimacy provides at least three insights, 
which will be addressed in this Part: First, the Founders’ 
understanding of legitimacy may offer a superior case for 
constitutional obedience. Second, it will show that at least as an 
originalist matter, broader hermeneutics than those currently offered 
by many originalists may be necessary. It will also demonstrate that 
because the Founders made compromises among the ends of 
government and these grounds for legitimacy, it may be difficult to 
find an appropriate originalist hermeneutic, though an original 
interpretive conventions approach has promise. Finally, this Part 
attempts to provide a new justification for originalism that 
synthesizes these various grounds of legitimacy. 
A. The Declaration of Independence 
What better place to start our search than in the very document 
through which our Founders declared they had a right to break from 
their old loyalties? The Declaration of Independence gives us an 
indication of everything the Constitution must accomplish to be 
legitimate: it must derive its powers from the consent of the 
governed; it must secure the just ends of government; and it must 
create a representative or democratic form of government.118 The 
literature too often ignores the connection between the Declaration 
and the Constitution, and many scholars have historically argued that 
 
 118. I was inspired early in my research by LARRY P. ARNN, THE FOUNDERS’ KEY: THE 
DIVINE AND NATURAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DECLARATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
AND WHAT WE RISK BY LOSING IT (2012). Arnn’s book is meant for a popular audience and it 
only introduces this connection between the principles of the Declaration and the 
requirements of a Constitution. This Article expands on his work by bringing to bear not just 
the words of the Declaration itself, but a wide range of the Founders’ writings on the subject 
of founding and constitutional legitimacy. 
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the Constitution of 1787 was a repudiation of the principles of 
1776.119 Nevertheless, in the Declaration, the Founders felt that they 
must “declare the causes which impel them to the separation”120 
from the political bands that had previously connected them, and 
thus it manifestly provides insight into general notions of political 
legitimacy at the time of the Founding. Indeed, this Part will show 
that the writing of the Constitution and its purposes at the time of 
the Framing evoke the same principles at play in the Declaration.121 
What, in the minds of the author and signers of the Declaration, 
made such a break from their previous bonds legitimate? The key 
clause is well known but also often overlooked: all men are created 
equal, they are endowed with unalienable rights including the right 
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and “[t]hat to secure 
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed.”122 In this one line 
the Founders offered the two most crucial bases for constitutional 
legitimacy: government must derive its power from the consent of 
the governed—a social contract of sorts—and it must secure our 
unalienable rights. In one fell swoop—at least if we buy the 
Founders’ account—we see that perhaps both the libertarian-
originalists and the popular-sovereignty conservatives simplify their 
own grounds for constitutional legitimacy.123 
 
 119. For a summary of the progressive literature making this argument, see ALAN 
GIBSON, INTERPRETING THE FOUNDING: GUIDE TO THE ENDURING DEBATES OVER THE 
ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 9–11 (2006). Martin Diamond 
also discusses this argument in his essay on the Federalist. See Martin Diamond, Democracy and 
the Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers’ Intent, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 52, 53 (1959). 
 120. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 121. Madison himself invoked the Declaration of Independence in the Federalist when 
justifying the authority of the Convention to propose a new constitution that would “abolish 
or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and 
happiness.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 249 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 122. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 123. Ely would have a response to my claims, as he himself consulted the Declaration but 
rejected this kind of comprehensive account of constitutional legitimacy. He argues that the 
Declaration of Independence was like a legal brief, and “[p]eople writing briefs are likely, and 
often well advised, to throw in arguments of every hue.” Specifically, “[p]eople writing briefs 
for revolution are obviously unlikely to have apparent positive law on their side, and are 
therefore well advised to rely on natural law.” ELY, supra note 55, at 49. Ely’s reasoning is 
unpersuasive, however. First, it is very likely that in justifying a break from positive law 
obligations, the Founders, as I’ve suggested, had to think long and hard about what gave them 
the right to do so. It is very possible, and in fact very likely, that they believed they had to 
appeal to natural rights because that was what was necessary for their act to be legitimate. 
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The Declaration does not stop there, however. The government, 
it implies, must not only derive its powers from the consent of the 
governed, but it must also continue to rule by self-government. That 
is, it must constitute a democratic or republican form of 
government. In the long chain of usurpations and abuses listed—
which impelled the separation—Jefferson writes that King George 
III has refused to pass laws “for the accommodation of large districts 
of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of 
Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and 
formidable to tyrants only.”124 Further, the King “has called together 
legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from 
the depository of their public Records,”125 and he has “dissolved 
Representative Houses repeatedly.”126 He has refused to cause other 
legislatures to be elected, and thus the legislative powers “have 
returned to the People at large for their exercise.”127 And more 
specifically, he has kept standing armies without the people’s consent 
and has taxed them without their consent.128 This train of abuses 
suggests that for a government to be legitimate at all, the people 
must be permitted to govern themselves in their own legislatures. 




That, it seems to me, reinforces the conclusion that a constitution must protect natural rights 
to be legitimate, rather than undermine it as Ely implies. Second, his criticism could be lodged 
in his own justification for constitutional legitimacy. That is, if we should not take their 
natural-rights claims seriously, why take their consent-of-the-governed claims seriously? They 
could have easily thrown in an argument of that “hue” just to see if that would stick. Indeed, it 
is interesting that Ely cites this same clause for his proposition that the Founders were 
overwhelmingly concerned with consent and representative government, but then chooses to 
ignore the natural rights language in this same clause. See id. at 90. 
 124. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 1776). 
 125. Id. at para. 6. 
 126. Id. at para. 7. 
 127. Id. at para. 8. 
 128. Id. at paras. 13, 19. 
 129. Arnn writes that we also can discover from the Declaration the importance of a 
separation of powers. See ARNN, supra note 118, at 32–36. Separation of powers is certainly 
necessary insofar as a government of divided powers is more likely to enable self-government 
without infringing on inalienable rights. 
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B. Natural Rights and Self-Government 
When the Framers debated the Constitution at the Convention, 
and when the people debated it in the throes of ratification, these 
same themes repeated. It could not be doubted that the 
Constitution had to be republican; it had to “enable” self-
government to be legitimate. As James Madison wrote in 
Federalist 39, 
The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and 
aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that 
no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people 
of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or 
with that honorable determination which animates every votary of 
freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of 
mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention, 
therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its 
advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.130 
John Adams, in his Thoughts on Government, likewise declared 
that “principles and reasonings . . . will convince any candid mind 
that there is no good government but what is republican.”131 As 
Gordon Wood has written, “For most Americans . . . this was the 
deeply felt meaning of the Revolution: they had created a new world, 
a republican world. No one doubted that the new polities would be 
republics.”132 
Yet the Framers did not want total self-government. From the 
first instance at the Convention, they rejected man’s capacity for 
pure democracy. Two days after the Virginia Plan was proposed in 
Convention, Mr. Gerry, one of the most Whiggish delegates, said, 
“The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The 
people do not want virtue; but are the dupes of pretended 
patriots.”133 Mr. Mason agreed, “admitt[ing] that we had been too 
 
 130. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 236. 
 131. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN 
ADAMS 83, 86 (George A. Peek, Jr., ed., 1954). 
 132. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, 47 
(1998). 
 133. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 48 (Max Farrand, ed., 
1966). 
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democratic,” though he “was afraid we [should] incautiously run 
into the opposite extreme.”134 These are telling statements from two 
delegates who would come to oppose the Constitution on the 
ground that it did not adequately safeguard the rights of the people; 
even the more “democratic” delegates believed the Union could not 
long survive on the principle of pure democracy. Mr. Randolph, who 
would also oppose the Constitution, observed that same day that the 
general object of the Senate “was to provide a cure for the evils 
under which the U.S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their 
origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of 
democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for [against] 
this tendency of our Government . . . .”135 
The solution adopted by the Constitution is now famous. The 
large sphere over which the federal republic could extend would 
mitigate the factional spirit of smaller republics by making it more 
difficult for a faction to possess the opinion of a majority of the 
people. As Madison wrote in Federalist 10, representation allows for 
two advantages: First, it will carve out a sphere for virtue because the 
body of men to which the people delegate authority will “refine and 
enlarge” the public views.136 Second, the republic can extend over a 
larger territory, and thus a single factional impulse will be less likely 
to actuate the spirit of a majority.137 But the two principles must go 
together. Just as a large territory by itself does not protect the rights 
of the people, neither does representation: Madison believed that the 
state legislatures that then existed were actuated by a spirit of faction. 
Though he praised the state legislatures when necessary for his 
argument,138 he also recognized their vices.139 The solution, then, 
must be to combine the principle of representation with the benefits 
of the larger extent of territory over which that same principle allows 
a republican government to rule. In this way the republican principle 
 
 134. Id. at 49. 
 135. Id. at 51. 
 136. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 76. 
 137. Id. at 78–79. 
 138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 341. 
 139. In Federalist 62 Madison is explicit on this point. He argues for the necessity of a 
bicameral legislature because “all single and numerous assemblies” have a propensity “to yield 
to the impulse of sudden and violent passions . . . . Examples on this subject might be cited 
without number; and from proceedings within the United States . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 
62 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 377. 
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can remedy the effect of faction because the diversity of faction 
would make it rare that any one attained a majority.140 
Thus republicanism over an extended territory would save self-
government. Yet the people’s rights still had to be protected even 
from the temporary passions expressed in republican majorities. To 
do so, the Framers intended to restrain republican institutions with 
checks and balances,141 federalism,142 and separation of powers,143 as 
well as by extending the size of the republic itself. These are 
overwhelmingly process-oriented protections, but the conclusion to 
draw is not that therefore we should “reinforce” representation 
through constitutional decisions. The protections were meant to 
check republican decision making as much as republicanism itself 
would be a check on faction; these protections were meant to create 
a certain form of republicanism that remedied the vices of popular 
government. 
The Constitution also included substantive protections, especially 
for property and contract rights.144 But the natural rights theory of 
 
 140. Again, none of this is very new. Ely writes about Federalist 51’s account of faction, 
see ELY, supra note 55, at 80, and Barnett emphasizes Federalist 10 to show how the Founders 
were deeply troubled by the prospects of majority rule and thus tried to constrain it, see 
BARNETT, supra note 10, at 33–39. For an excellent account of The Federalist along these 
same lines, see Diamond, supra note 119, at 64–67. 
 141. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 382–83 
(arguing that the Senate will protect the people “against their own temporary errors and 
delusions,” and that in moments of temporary passion, “how salutary will be the interference 
of some temperate and respectable body of citizens” to check such passions “until reason, 
justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind?”). The consensus among the 
Framers was that the Senate would be the most effective check on the popular passions of the 
people: Mr. Dickenson argued that a Senate chosen by the state legislatures would protect the 
states against encroachments from the general government, 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 133, at 152–53, but also create a body of virtuous men, id. 
at 150. Mason believed that the Senate would protect both the states, id. at 407, and the 
wealthy, id. at 428. Madison agreed that the tendency to refine and enlarge the public views 
would be amplified in the Senate, which had the “advantage of favoring a select appointment.” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 375. 
 142. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 320 
(arguing that in a federal system such as the one contemplated by the Constitution, “a double 
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at 
the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”). 
 143. See, e.g., id. at 319 (arguing that a separation of powers will let “ambition . . . 
counteract ambition.”). 
 144. Barnett already provides a thorough account of the Founders’ views on natural 
rights and the substantive protections they built into the Constitution to protect those natural 
rights. See BARNETT, supra note 10, at 54–76. For a historical overview of Lockean scholarship 
on the Founding, see GIBSON, supra note 119, at 13–21. 
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Barnett and Epstein requires further discussion. While almost all 
Americans agreed with the abstract concept of natural rights—and 
the proposition that law contrary to natural law was void—natural 
rights as such was not a starting point for discussion at the 
Convention. The Constitution could not be inconsistent with 
natural rights, but the substantive protections the document 
afforded were most fundamentally rooted in the positive law of 
constitutions, international law, and the common law. For our 
purposes, the point is simply that the libertarian-originalists are right 
to say that the Founders did believe the Constitution had to protect 
natural rights; their flaw is that they begin with that premise in order 
to arrive at the Constitution’s meaning. 
In sum, from this cursory account, it appears that the libertarian-
originalist view of constitutional legitimacy is not how the Founders 
understood it; it is unlikely that the Founders really would have 
intended the constitutional provisions to enshrine a presumption of 
liberty or classical liberalism any more than they would have 
intended to create the conditions for self-rule. Similarly, the 
Founders thought the Constitution had to be fundamentally 
republican to be legitimate, but not purely republican, in the same 
way that it could not be purely democratic. Thus the progressive 
theorists who focus on “reinforcing” representation or “enabling” 
self-government through current debates over constitutional 
construction incorrectly de-emphasize the importance of substantive 
rights protections, such as property and contract rights, that were 
not meant to—but have nevertheless—eroded. 
C. Popular Sovereignty 
The Founders believed that the Constitution needed both to 
establish a republican form of government and to protect natural 
rights; but they also believed that to be legitimate, the Constitution 
itself needed to be rooted firmly in the consent of the governed. As 
we shall see, this notion of popular sovereignty has very different 
implications than the notions of self-government, representation, or 
rule by the general will of the people. Because even legislators cannot 
be trusted not to abuse their power, and thus properly to discharge 
the people’s will, the consent of the governed is necessary at the 
moment of foundation in order to restrain the powers of the 
legislators to ensure they act more consonantly with the true 
interests and will of the people themselves. 
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The Declaration of Independence was the most definitive 
declaration of the right of popular, rather than some other kind of, 
sovereignty.145 James Otis declared in 1764 that “supreme absolute 
power is originally and ultimately in the people; and they never did 
in fact freely, nor can they rightfully make an absolute, unlimited 
renunciation of this divine right.”146 Samuel Adams declared in 1772 
that “[w]hen Men enter into Society, it is by voluntary consent; and 
they have a right to demand and insist upon the performance of such 
conditions, and previous limitations as form an equitable original 
compact.”147 Thomas Paine adumbrated the origins of civil society in 
his 1776 pamphlet Common Sense. When the defect in the moral 
virtue of individuals reveals the necessity of establishing a 
government, men will create a convention or assembly to deliberate 
over the form of government. “In this first parliament,” Paine wrote, 
“every man by natural right will have a seat.”148 
To take two last examples, Alexander Hamilton wrote in 1775 
that “the origin of all civil government, justly established, must be a 
voluntary compact, between the rulers and the ruled; and must be 
liable to such limitations, as are necessary for the security of the 
absolute rights of the latter;” for, he asks, “what original title can any 
man or set of men have, to govern others, except their own 
consent?”149 Thomas Tudor Tucker, perhaps the earliest pamphleteer 
to develop fully the idea of a constitution rooted in consent of the 
governed as the proper mechanism for restraining the ruled, wrote in 
1784: “All authority is derived from the people at large, held only 
during their pleasure, and exercised only for their benefit,” and 
therefore “the privileges of the legislative branches ought to be 
defined by the constitution,” which must itself be “the avowed act of 
the people at large.”150 Tucker further stated, “It should be the first 
 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 122–123. 
 146. James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in ISAAC 
KRAMNICK & THEODORE J. LOWI, AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 100, 102 (2009) (1764) 
(emphasis in original). 
 147. Samuel Adams, The Rights of the Colonists, in KRAMNICK & LOWI, supra note 146, 
at 108, 109 (1772) (emphasis in original). 
 148. Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in KRAMNICK & LOWI, supra note 146, at 131, 132 
(1776). 
 149. HAROLD C. SYRETT ET AL., EDS., THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1961–
79), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch3s5.html. 
 150. WOOD, supra note 132, at 280–81 (quoting Thomas Tudor Tucker, Conciliatory 
Hints, Attempting, by a Fair State of Matters, to Remove Party Prejudice). 
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and fundamental law of the State, and should prescribe the limits of 
all delegated power. It should be declared to be paramount to all acts 
of the Legislature, and irrepealable and unalterable by any authority 
but the express consent of a majority of the citizens collected by such 
regular mode as may be therein provided.”151 
In the Federalist Papers, Madison presumed the legitimacy of 
this sovereignty and its necessity in forming a new government. In 
Federalist 38 he argued that America “has been sensible of her 
malady” and “has obtained a regular and unanimous advice from 
men of her own deliberate choice.”152 Hamilton also relied on the 
ultimate legitimacy of popular sovereignty when he declared that “it 
seems to have been reserved to the people of this country . . . to 
decide the important question, whether societies of men are really 
capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and 
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their 
political constitution on accident and force.”153 Madison reminded 
us finally that “the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, 
and it is from them that the constitutional character . . . is 
derived . . . .”154 
Ratification, of course, is consonant with this view of popular 
sovereignty. Madison wrote that ratification appears to be both a 
federal and a national act: “the Constitution is to be founded on the 
assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies 
elected for the special purpose,” but it is also derived from “the 
assent and ratification of the several States,” whose powers are in 
turn derived from “the authority of the people themselves.” Madison 
ultimately concluded that ratification is more a federal than a 
national act, but the Constitution will still depend on the authority 
not of the state governments acting through state legislatures, but 
“by that of the people themselves.” 155  In his final extended 
discussion on the ratification provision, Madison argued that the 
provision “speaks for itself”: “The express authority of the people 
alone could give due validity to the Constitution.”156 Hamilton 
 
 151. WOOD, supra note 132, at 281. 
 152. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 231. 
 153. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 121, at 27. 
 154. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 310. 
 155. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 239–40. 
 156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 275. 
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suggested, moreover, that ratification by the people is a distinct 
advantage of the Constitution over the Articles of Confederation, 
which was ratified by the states.157 
Madison later added that without the ratification process the 
Constitution would not be binding, even if it were just and 
republican. The Constitution requires the assent of the people. The 
proposed Constitution was “of no more consequence than the paper 
on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of 
those to whom it is addressed.”158 The Convention bore in mind 
that the “plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted to the 
people themselves, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would 
destroy it forever; its approbation blot out antecedent errors and 
irregularities.” 159  James Wilson agreed with Madison when 
responding to charges that the Convention exceeded its authority. “I 
think the late Convention has done nothing beyond their powers,” 
Wilson argued.160 The Constitution “is laid before the citizens . . . to 
be judged by the natural, civil and political rights of men. By their 
fiat, it will become of value and authority; without it, it will never 
receive the character of authenticity and power.”161 
Popular sovereignty, or at least popular ratification of 
fundamental constitutions, was still a relatively new concept when 
the Constitution was drafted. Between 1776 and 1778, twelve state 
constitutions were enacted, ten by ordinary legislation and two by 
special convention. None was submitted to popular ratification.162 
Indeed, the Framers at first attempted to offer justifications for their 
authority on the basis of the sovereignty of the several states, even 
though Madison163 insisted on popular sovereignty early on. It was 
not until later in their deliberations that “their focus shifted to the 
legitimating effect of popular ratification and a theory of popular 
 
 157. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 121, at 148. 
 158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 248. 
 159. Id. at 249 (emphasis in original). 
 160. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 276 (2d. ed. 2005) (quoting James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying 
Convention (December 4, 1787)). 
 161. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 162. Id. at 48. 
 163. See id. at 50 (Madison arguing that “the new Constitution should be ratified in the 
most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves”). 
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sovereignty.”164 Certainly, not everyone agreed on this principle. On 
the day the Convention adopted popular ratification, Gerry still 
argued, “Great confusion . . . would result from a recurrence to the 
people. They would never agree on any thing.”165 Mr. Elseworth 
argued that the people exist in states as a fact, and even if unanimous 
consent were to be abandoned, ratification by a majority of state 
legislatures would suit a new compact. 166  Gouverneur Morris 
quashed such notions. If a confederation of states was to be pursued 
as Elseworth seemed to desire, it would require unanimous consent 
of the states pursuant to the compact already existing. “Whereas in 
case of an appeal to the people of the U.S., the supreme authority, 
the federal compact may be altered by a majority of them . . . .”167 
Madison then drove the point home: a true Constitution, as opposed 
to a mere treaty or compact, is one founded on the people and not 
on any pre-existing government body. 168  The Convention then 
adopted popular ratification as the mode that would legitimize its 
authority and the authority of the Constitution. 
Gordon Wood, in his seminal work on the creation of the 
American republic, illustrates with myriad examples from the 
Founding period this new understanding of popular sovereignty 
requiring an initial social compact restraining even the people’s 
legislators.169 Wood explains why this concept was so new and took 
time to develop: “[S]ince the legislatures, as the legitimate 
representatives, were the spokesmen for the people in the society, it 
was difficult, if not impossible, without a new conception of 
representation to deny them the right to alter or to construe the 
constitutions as they saw fit when the needs of the society 
demanded.”170 Yet just such a new conception of representation was 
necessary because of the widespread disquietude over the unjust acts 
of the state legislatures in the Critical Period (1776–87). Americans 
grew more and more dissatisfied with “the fairest and fullest 
representative legislatures in the world.”171 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 54. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 55 (emphasis in original). 
 168. Id. at 56. 
 169. See WOOD, supra note 132, at 268–91. 
 170. Id. at 274. 
 171. Id. at 276. 
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The important point is that popular sovereignty, as the Founding 
generation understood it, was not equivalent to direct rule by the 
people or even representative rule by the people. It was the people’s 
very representatives who were violating the rights of the people. 
Thus, rule by the general will of the legislature was an inadequate 
expression of the true will of the whole people. Because the people 
could not rule themselves properly even through the most 
representative of governments, to be truly sovereign they had to 
delimit the power of the government in a contract. That was the 
only way to maintain their sovereignty. 
D. Prudence and the Problem of Founding 
Part II.B showed that the Founders had a commitment to self-
government as well as to natural rights, and they likely intended to 
write a constitution that would enable democratic majorities to rule 
but also protect their natural rights. Thus, the Constitution, to be 
legitimate, would need to make some kind of compromise between 
the protection of natural rights and republican rule for legitimacy. 
Part II.C showed that the Founders also believed that, through the 
initial act of popular sovereignty, the people in the past would 
explicitly bind the future—including republican majorities—to their 
will. 
But might any of these grounds for legitimacy be flawed? For 
example, some argue that the initial ratification was defective because 
portions of the population, such as women and slaves, were excluded 
from the process.172 The Constitution also may not have been—and 
it may not be—sufficiently republican or sufficiently protective of 
natural rights to satisfy some. Simply put, especially if the 
Constitution or its ratification was flawed, why does one generation, 
long dead and gone, have a right to bind another? Many progressives 
have referred to this difficult problem as Jefferson’s “dead hand of 
the past.”173 
The answer to Jefferson’s problem may be more intuitive than 
one might think: founding a government is extremely difficult and 
 
 172. For a discussion of this argument, see supra note 87. 
 173. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 3, at 41–44 (explaining the dead hand argument, and 
how his theory solves it); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 99–104 (2010); 
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 703, 796–97 (2002). 
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the exercise should rarely be repeated. This is how James Madison 
understood the challenge of founding, and it was his answer to 
Jefferson. Because many scholars continue to invoke Jefferson for the 
dead-hand proposition, it is only fitting that we explore the views of 
the Founder who most directly responded to him. This gives us 
insight into another possible ground for constitutional legitimacy, 
and is worth exploring for the additional reason that his response has 
been so understudied in the literature.174 
Jefferson’s formulation of the problem of a perpetual 
constitution is well known. “The question Whether one generation 
of men has a right to bind another, seems never to have been started 
either on this or our side of the water,” he wrote Madison. “Yet it is 
a question of such consequences as not only to merit decision, but 
place also, among the fundamental principles of every 
government. . . . I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self 
evident, ‘that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;’ that the dead 
have neither powers nor rights over it.”175  
Madison’s response, in which he argued that past acts of popular 
sovereignty can bind the living, is less known. He wrote Jefferson in 
a subsequent letter: 
If the earth be the gift of nature to the living, their title can extend 
to the earth in its natural state only. The improvements made by 
the dead form a debt against the living, who take the benefit of 
them. This debt cannot be otherwise discharged than by a 
proportionate obedience to the will of the Authors of the 
improvements.176 
 
 174. Indeed, I could find only three law review articles that have quoted in the text, and 
only in passing or without discussion, the relevant portions of Madison’s letter to Jefferson, 
dated February 4, 1790, in which he directly responds to Jefferson’s claim that the earth 
belongs to the living and that we must have constitutional conventions every nineteen years. 
See Robert Blecker, If I Implore You and Order You to Set Me Free, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 561, 
570 (2004); Maurice H. Merrill, Constitutional Interpretation: The Obligation to Respect the 
Text, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 530, 551–52 (1972); Bran C. Noonan, The Fate of New York Public 
Education Is a Matter of Interpretation: A Story of Competing Methods of Constitutional 
Interpretation, the Nature of Law, and a Functional Approach to the New York Education 
Article, 70 ALB. L. REV. 625, 636–37 (2007). Several others articles have, however, cited to 
the letter in footnotes, but none has given the text any treatment. I also could not find any 
that contained an extensive discussion of Federalist 38 in this context. 
 175. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THE 
ESSENTIAL JEFFERSON 176, 176 (Jean M. Yarbrough ed., 2006) (emphasis in original). 
 176. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in THE MIND OF 
THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 176, 177 
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Madison specifically mentioned repelling conquest, “the evils of 
which descend through many generations,” as an example of 
forming a debt against the living. 177  Indeed, why should men 
sacrifice their lives—or their fortunes or sacred honor for that 
matter—if posterity did not maintain the just fruits of such sacrifices? 
The Constitution was formed on the heels of a bloody 
revolution, but Madison’s claim regarding conquest extends to 
constitution-making itself, as we see from his arguments in 
Federalists 37 and 38. In the former, he wrote of the necessity of 
“sacrific[ing] theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous 
considerations.”178 He further stated: 
The history of almost all the great councils and consultations held 
among mankind for reconciling their discordant opinions, 
assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting their respective 
interests, is a history of factions, contentions, and disappointments, 
and may be classed among the most dark and degrading pictures 
which display the infirmities and depravities of the human 
character.179 
In short, Madison argued that founding is an extremely difficult 
enterprise. It should not be too-often repeated. In surveying the 
turbulent history of foundings in Federalist 38, Madison concluded: 
If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the improvement 
made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and 
establishing regular plans of government, they serve not less, on 
the other, to admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident to 
such experiments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily 
multiplying them.180 
Prudence, for Madison, justifies ignoring the imperfections of 
the Constitution. Prudence itself lends support to the proposition 
that the Constitution is a legitimate document—even if it is 
imperfectly legitimate with respect to other bases of legitimacy.181 
 
(Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981) (emphasis in original). 
 177. Id. 
 178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 226. 
 179. Id. at 227. 
 180. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 229. 
 181. For an interesting essay interpreting the role of prudence in Madison’s political 
thought in Federalist numbers 37–40, see generally Gary Rosen, James Madison and the 
Problem of Founding, 58 REV. POL. 561 (1996). 
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Madison’s concern for prudence can perhaps be reformulated in 
terms of another notion that is required for constitutional or political 
legitimacy: stability. “Stability in government,” wrote Madison in 
Federalist 37, “is essential to national character and to the 
advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in 
the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil 
society.” 182  While he was discussing the balance of energy and 
stability provided by the constitutional structure of the new 
government, his reasoning applies to constitutionalism itself. How 
legitimate would the Constitution be were it subject to the 
vicissitudes of temporary passions and opinions, if it were constantly 
mutable? Indeed, this concern for stability motivated Madison to 
warn in Federalist 49 against unnecessarily multiplying the 
“reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole 
society.”183 We do not want the people continuously to change the 
Constitution precisely because “as every appeal to the people would 
carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent 
appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the government of that 
veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which 
perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the 
requisite stability.” 184  Stability, understood as a prudential 
requirement in human affairs, is another requirement for 
constitutional legitimacy.185 
That is not to say that any constitution must be accepted. 
Madison noted the improvements made by the American 
Constitution and earlier wrote that “the convention must have 
enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption from the pestilential 
influence of party animosities—the disease most incident to 
deliberative bodies and most apt to contaminate their 
proceedings.”186 The Constitution must also be, therefore, on the 
whole good and just; but it need not necessarily be entirely just. 
Prudence or stability may justify adherence to the whole. 
 
 
 182. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 223. 
 183. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 312. 
 184. Id. at 311 (emphasis added). 
 185. Thomas Tudor Tucker made this same observation. Only a constitution rooted in 
the collective will of the people “would have the most promising chance of stability.” WOOD, 
supra note 132, at 281. 
 186. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 227. 
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Jefferson’s letter notwithstanding, we might note that the 
Declaration of Independence, which Jefferson himself authored, is in 
fact consistent with Madison’s view of stability and prudence. The 
Declaration states that when “it becomes necessary for [a] people to 
dissolve the political bands which [had previously] connected 
them, . . . a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that 
they . . . declare the causes which impel them to the separation.”187 
The Declaration did not contemplate whimsical dissolution of the 
existing social order. That order must secure the people’s rights to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is only when a “Form of 
Government becomes destructive of these ends,” that it is the 
“Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government . . . .”188 By the very reasoning and principles of the 
Declaration, a people, including our generation, does not have an 
unequivocal right to alter or abolish its government as long as it on 
the whole secures the rights of the people to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness. As long as our Constitution is on the whole just 
and legitimate, prudence may demand an adherence to the political 
bands that already unite us. 
III. CONCLUSION, AND A CODA ON ORIGINALISM 
What this Article has aimed to show is that each of the three 
schools of originalism discussed here, all of which rely on a different 
notion of constitutional legitimacy, has some basis in the Founders’ 
own understanding of legitimacy. The Founders intended the 
Constitution to be republican, to protect our natural rights, and to 
be obeyed simply because the people consented initially, and they 
expected that the act of founding would be extremely difficult if not 
impossible to repeat. In a way, we do not have to decide between 
theories of constitutional legitimacy; we can decide, just as the 
Founders did, that the Constitution is worthy of our obedience 
because it is mostly legitimate in all three ways, and prudence thus 
justifies obedience to the whole. 
We can also now observe that the three strains of constitutional 
interpretation are at best incomplete. The Framers did not intend to 
enable democracy simply through the Constitution’s open-ended 
 
 187. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
 188. Id. at para. 2. 
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rights provisions or to constrain it simply through those provisions; 
thus, both Balkin and his libertarian-originalist counterparts simplify 
their claims too much. Rather, the Framers wanted to enable 
democracy, but they wanted to enable it precisely by constraining its 
excesses. It then becomes clear that the presumption-of-
constitutionality originalists may also simplify the political theory of 
the Constitution. Put differently, perhaps no construction such as a 
“presumption of liberty” or a “presumption of constitutionality” can 
reliably be used in determining original meaning because the 
Framers had to make compromises among the ends of government 
and the three grounds of legitimacy. 
That does not mean originalists should lose hope. There has 
been tremendous scholarship lately on the “original interpretive 
conventions” of the Founding generation. The claim of “original 
interpretive conventions” originalism is that we can reliably interpret 
the Constitution without resort to any modern construction such as 
the presumption of liberty or constitutionality. The Founding 
generation had a way of interpreting legal texts; if we simply follow 
those conventions, most ambiguity in the constitutional text will 
disappear. Moreover, there is no need to decide whether a 
constitutional provision has any definitive meaning. We need only 
decide in particular cases whether it is more likely than not that the 
Constitution permits or prohibits the government action at issue. We 
need only decide what is the more probable answer.189 With these 
principles in mind, constitutional interpretation from an originalist 
perspective can take into account all three grounds of constitutional 
legitimacy and still be a feasible enterprise. 
To be sure, interpretation might still “run out.” We might find 
that there is a range of plausible originalist answers to any given 
question. What should a judge do then? I suspect I know what a 
judge will do: a more libertarian judge will apply the presumption of 
liberty; a more conservative one will apply a presumption of 
constitutionality; and a more progressive one will seek to enhance 
the democratic process. In one sense the choice will be arbitrary; but 
in another, any of them might be justified by the Founders’ view of 
legitimacy. Perhaps that is the best we can do.  
Finally, we must end on a note about originalism itself as the 
correct method of constitutional interpretation. After all, thus far we 
 
 189. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 83, at 243–45. 
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have only shown why the Founders believed the Constitution to be 
legitimate, and what that implies for the actual meaning of the 
original Constitution. But originalism as a method of interpretation 
does not necessarily follow from constitutional obedience. Surely 
some could argue that while the Constitution ought to be obeyed, 
originalism is impossible to adopt for any number of reasons. 
Perhaps we simply do not have sufficient historical data available. Or 
some could argue that the document itself requires non-originalist 
interpretation. Whether we ought to obey the Constitution, and 
whether we ought to interpret it as originalists, are still two distinct 
questions. 
I would like to propose that the questions are not as distinct as 
most originalist scholars claim.190 It seems intuitive to argue that if 
we accept that the Constitution of 1787 is legitimate and worthy of 
obedience, then we can only truly obey it if we follow its original 
meaning. What is the Constitution but the meaning of its words? As 
Balkin wrote, to maintain the framework of the Constitution over 
time “we must preserve the meaning of the words that constitute the 
framework.”191 Or, “[t]o stick to the plan and implement it, we must 
respect its particular choices about freedom and constraint for 
political actors . . . .” 192  And finally: “If we do not attempt to 
preserve legal meaning over time, then we will not be following the 
written Constitution as our plan but instead will be following a 
different plan.”193 It seems that the very meaning of adherence to 
the Constitution is that we must be originalists. 
But if one is not persuaded by Balkin, then any of the other 
justifications for originalism may still hold. Each of the scholars 
discussed has separated the question of constitutional legitimacy from 
that of why we need to be originalists. Now that we have established 
what I contend is a more persuasive ground for constitutional 
legitimacy, nothing stops us from adopting Barnett’s contract theory, 
or Whittington’s and other scholars’ “writtenness” theories. 
 
 
 190. Recall that many of the recent conservative originalists, such as Lawson and Solum, 
explicitly separate these questions, and that many other originalists—including the libertarians 
and progressives—all claim to be separating these questions even if they seem to fail to do so in 
practice. 
 191. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 35–36. 
 192. Id. at 36. 
 193. Id. 
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If these two possibilities still do not satisfy, perhaps one could 
argue that originalism is the only interpretive method that is 
legitimate in all four ways discussed in this Article: If the original 
Constitution struck a proper balance between natural rights and self-
government, then an originalist interpretation of the Constitution 
would be legitimate on these two grounds. That said, perhaps the 
Court’s modern glosses on the Constitution have struck a better 
balance that is more legitimate. That may be. But the “originalist 
Constitution” has the added advantage of having been ratified by an 
initial act of popular sovereignty. Lastly, prudence demands 
adherence to the originalist Constitution because modern glosses 
may very well strike a worse balance between natural rights and self-
government, and constantly changing glosses may undermine the 
requisite stability in government. 
If one accepts the grounds of legitimacy accepted by the 
Founders and articulated here, then the legitimacy of the 
Constitution as originally understood is established. It may very well 
be that a modern, non-originalist interpretation of the Constitution 
meets the same (or even different) requirements for legitimacy; but 
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